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Abstract 
 
Devon Ritter: The EU and Conflict: Critically Assessing the Success of the ESDP and its 
Impact in Conflict Areas 
(Under the direction of Milada Vachudova) 
 
 With the EU continuing to expand it’s foreign policy platform, including 
operating as conflict management actors, it is important to analyze their performance thus 
far.  This thesis will outline the goals and capabilities of the European Security and 
Defense Policy (ESDP), focusing on three varied attempts at conflict management in 
order to assess whether the EU can and should continue with ESDP.  What will be shown 
is that while ESDP has had some mixed success, there is potential for the EU to be a 
significant actor in the future.  Additionally, the thesis will show that along with conflict 
resolution and maintenance of peace, successful ESDP operations can lead to important 
improvements in long-tern human welfare. 
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Introduction 
 Since the end of World War II, the number of conflicts has been relatively low 
compared to the history of conflicts prior to the period from 1946-present.  That being 
said, there has never been a point when conflict did not exist in some part of the world.  
For most of this period, Europe had an especially low number of conflicts to deal with.  
However, this has changed in recent years as shown by the flare up of war in the Balkans 
and more recently the Caucasus.  Likewise, the number of conflicts in Africa and Asia, 
which threaten the stability of young independent states, is a worry for global security.  
Because of this, it is very important to have international bodies that can monitor and 
manage conflicts.  Particularly in Europe and the EU’s backyard, it is more and more 
important that the European Union themselves have the capability to address conflicts.  
And because conflicts far away can have a significant effect in Europe, it is also 
important that the EU be more active in dealing with those distant crisis situations.  It is 
no secret that as the EU has grown, security has become an issue of increased importance 
within the EU.  While the expanding borders of the European Union have brought certain 
threats closer to home, the expanding resources, knowledge and power of the EU have 
also provided them with the tools to deal with threats specific to the EU as well as 
conflict on a global scale. 
 In this thesis I explore the growing relationship between the European Union and 
conflict via the EU’s efforts in conflict management through European Security and 
Defence Policy (ESDP).  By conflict management, I mean the use of EU resources and 
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manpower to help facilitate an end to violence.  One form of this is peace making, such 
as initiating a cease-fire and helping to negotiate the terms of peace treaties.  Though 
more commonly in the short history of EU conflict management, this means 
peacekeeping.  Most of the EU’s ESDP operations thus far have been to secure and 
maintain an end to violence after peace agreements have been made.  The specific 
purpose of this study however is to determine under what conditions ESDP has been 
successful in it’s conflict management attempts.  What are the factors that account for 
why the EU has been successful in some circumstances and less successful in others?  
Additionally, how does the success or lack of success of EU operations impact the overall 
long-term well-being in those places where operations have taken place? 
 I argue that there are two distinct factors that play a large role in accounting for 
the success of the EU and ESDP.  First of all, geographic proximity to the EU, 
specifically, whether or not operations take place within Europe itself.  For those 
operations that do take place in non-EU Europe, the EU has a tool that is not available in 
any other case.  That is willingness to offer and negotiate future EU membership.  As will 
be shown, this has been very important in places such as Bosnia.  The second factor is the 
variation in goals that different ESDP operations have.  Those operations that have far 
reaching goals and mandates have shown to be much more successful in bringing about 
or maintaining an end to violence.  In accounting for this factor, the issue of political will 
must be addressed, as political will is an important factor in itself when the EU creates 
operational mandates and sets out their goals.  These factors explain the success of 
individual operations.  Additionally, I argue that when the EU is successful, there is a 
benefit to long-term well-being for the populations where operations have taken place.  
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While the benefits of success vary from case to case, I also argue that when the ESDP 
operations fail to manage conflicts, the lack of improvement in well-being is very clear. 
 To support these arguments I will look at three case studies of ESDP operations.  
For each one, I will outline what the operations entail, and what the goals of the operation 
were, using primary source material from the EU to do this.  After describing the 
missions themselves, I will use data to provide a picture of the current levels of violence 
within each of the three countries or regions where the ESDP operations took place.  This 
data will support my conclusions on whether or not the individual operations were 
successful in managing conflict.  To draw the relationship to long-term well-being, I will 
include evidence from the World Health Organization, OECD, and other research 
projects that shows GNP per capita levels, poverty levels, and percentage of populations 
affected by various diseases or viruses, to name a few categories.  By showing changes, 
or the lack of change, to these figures from the time of conflict until now, the evidence 
will provide support for my argument that the success of ESDP operations is very 
important to long-term well-being. 
 In order to effectively make these arguments, the thesis will be split into five main 
sections.  The first section will provide background on the ESDP.  It will show how it 
developed out of the EU’s Common Foreign Security Policy and how is has changed and 
evolved up until today.  This will include a description of what the goals of ESDP are, as 
well as what the capabilities are.  The following three sections will be devoted to the 
three individual case studies.  In the first case study I look at Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
The first sub-section of this examines the ESDP mission, in this case EUFOR-ALTHEA.  
The second sub-section examines the impact that the ESDP has had on social welfare and 
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long-term well-being.  In the second case study I focus on the conflict in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo.  Again, I first look at the ESDP missions, followed by a section 
describing well-being.  The last case study is on Aceh, Indonesia, following the same 
pattern of the other two.  The information from the three studies will show the varying 
success of ESDP and the impact that it can have in conflict areas.  I will use that 
information in the final section to evaluate the EU’s performance in conflict management 
and the potential for ESDP as the EU goes ahead in conflict management operations. 
 
Table 1: Factors Affecting Outcomes of ESDP Operations 
  
Case Studies 
 
 
Factors 
BiH DRC Aceh 
Geographic 
Proximity 
 
Success helped by use 
of SAAs and promotion 
of future EU 
membership. 
Promotion of EU 
membership not 
possible. 
Promotion of EU 
membership not possible. 
Scope of 
Mandate/ 
Political 
Will 
 
Mandate that allowed 
for maintenance of 
peace, due in part to a 
strong political will.  
 
Mandate and 
objectives of 
operations too limited 
to effectively manage 
conflict. 
Early signs of political will 
and focused objectives 
aimed at successfully 
managing conflict and 
maintaining peace. 
 
    
ESDP: Evolution, Tools and State of Play 
 The details of the creation of European Security and Defense Policy are important 
for understanding how the EU came to a point where it could be a conflict management 
actor.  Additionally, development and changes to ESDP help to explain the differences 
between various missions over the course of the last five years and why some have been 
more successful than others.  In large part, ESDP was created because of the EU’s failure 
to act effectively in the Balkans when war broke out in the early 1990s.  While the EU 
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had made positive strides with a Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP), which finally 
brought together shared concerns and strategies; they did not have the means to 
implement strategy.  This became widely apparent when they took on the task of 
managing the conflict in Bosnia and failed to do so.  Again in 1998, with the crisis in 
Kosovo, the EU relied on NATO military capabilities to resolve the conflict.  Both of 
these situations were catalysts to what was one of the outcomes of the Cologne Council 
in 1999, which was the creation of ESDP.  Later that year at the European Council in 
Helsinki, the EU agreed upon the Helsinki Headline Goal, which stated that by 2003, the 
EU must have the capacity to deploy a force of 60,000 troops within 60 days that could 
be sustained for a year.  Having the adequate military tools to act, the EU has since been 
able to launch ESDP operations, the first of which was the EU policing mission in 
Bosnia, which began January 2003. 
 The development of the ESDP in 1999 and subsequent changes affecting foreign 
policy have given the EU increased opportunities to get involved in conflict management 
as well as larger capabilities for handling conflicts.  ESDP was designed to “equip the EU 
with effective decision-making mechanisms and to develop credible military and civilian 
capabilities in order to undertake the full range of conflict prevention and crisis 
management tasks defined in the Treaty on European Union” (Montanaro-Jankovski, 
2007, pg. 140).  While this does not mean there is an available European Army, there are 
organized troops available for ESDP missions.  Since 2007, battle groups have been 
available which provide around 1,500 troops that can operate for 30 days, or up to 120 if 
they are properly re-supplied (EU Council Secretariat, 2007).  The creation of these battle 
groups was prompted by the knowledge that having 60,000 troops available, as suggested 
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by the Helsinki Headline Goal, was not feasible.  Battle groups of this size are probably 
not capable of forcefully ending a conflict, but they can be useful for military operations 
looking to maintain peace in post-conflict situations.  Additionally, operations such as 
ALTHEA, where around 7,000 troops were initially used (European Union, 2008), prove 
that the EU can gather more soldiers when necessary.  If the EU uses their diplomatic and 
civilian measures to bring about a period of peace, then the military aspects of ESDP 
could prove useful.  
 Another important development that has improved the capabilities of the EU has 
been the creation of the post of High Representative for CFSP, occupied by Javier 
Solana.  Solana’s presence has helped coordinate foreign policy and his commitment has 
been important in developing and implementing ESDP operations.  There have been 
difficulties in past lead up to operations based on the fact that certain individuals or 
member-states have been hesitant to throw all their support behind a mission.  Solana has 
not only been important in meeting with foreign governments and leaders to arrange 
potential operations, but also in enlisting the support within the EU.  Such efforts have 
made the EU more capable in terms of getting missions started quickly in hopes of 
improving their potential success. 
 Looking beyond those aspects only related to CFSP/ESDP, the EU does have other 
elements at their disposal that can be used to assist in managing conflicts.  While the EU 
may be expanding their foreign policy potential to show that they are not solely an 
economic presence, the fact that they are such a large economy helps.  By having 
significant funds available and a market that foreign countries want access to, their 
economic position can be used in conflict resolutions.  Even for those countries outside of 
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Europe, the prospect of developmental aid funds and increased access to the EU market 
can be an important motivational tool for working towards the goal of establishing a 
peaceful environment.  However, in high-risk areas where the potential for renewed 
conflict is probable, these techniques are only likely to work in conjunction with some 
sort of military, peace stabilizing effort. 
  Finally, as I will discuss in more detail with the case of Bosnia, EU conflict 
management missions in Europe can use Stabilization and Association Agreements to 
negotiate conflict resolutions and outline development strategies.  The idea behind SAAs 
was that, “to avoid further conflict greater international efforts would be needed to 
promote economic and political stability as well as regional cooperation” (Phinnemore, 
2003, pg. 79).  However, the purpose of SAAs is “not just association but, more 
importantly, in the short- to medium-term at least, stabilisation” (Phinnemore, 2003, pg. 
79).  This aspect of the agreements highlights why they would be important in areas 
dealing with conflicts.  Before being able to successfully interact economically, or 
develop legitimate political systems, the country itself has to have a stable environment.  
With the prospect of greater integration and potential membership within the EU, regions 
such as the Western Balkans have more motivation to work with the EU in conflict 
management.  The enhanced opportunities that SAAs offer, aid ESDP operations and 
may also lead European countries in conflict to seek out the EU to assist in resolutions 
rather than other international bodies such as the UN. 
 However, in order to evaluate the EU’s conflict management attempts with the 
ESDP, we must also understand the EU’s own standards for success.  The European 
security strategy is designed to manage threats stemming from regional conflicts, state 
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failure and organized crime (Whitman Lecture, 2008).  When taking action, the EU has 
stated they would follow the Petersburg Tasks, which include humanitarian rescue 
missions, peacekeeping, crisis management and peacemaking (Hyde-Price Lecture, 
2008).  Using diplomatic civilian efforts and the military tools mentioned above, the EU 
has to some extent, touched on all of the Petersburg Tasks in operations, however in 
varying combinations with various levels of success. 
 Looking at the missions that the EU has launched and completed, it appears that 
operational success is defined by meeting the goals they set when beginning a mission.  
While this may seem rather obvious and sufficient, if a mission’s goals are not high 
enough, then an operation may not actually meet the objectives of the ESDP as a whole, 
which are, “preventing conflicts and managing crises” and “strengthen[ing] the security 
of the Union in all ways” (European Commission, 2005).  This discrepancy is something 
which needs to be addressed when the EU evaluates itself, and when others evaluate the 
EU.   
 That being said, ESDP is still rather new, and has had to battle limited resources 
and at times a lack of consensus among member states that is required for operations to 
take place.  Having started with limited expectations may help to explain why the ESDP 
has been proclaimed more of a success than perhaps deserved at times.  For example, the 
EU has completed operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo that they have been 
classified as successful, which as I will argue later, have really not been successful 
examples of conflict management.  But as High Representative Javier Solana points out, 
“in the past few years, ESDP is probably the area where we have made the most progress 
in the EU” (Solana, 2007, pg. 9) and, “the days that European security and defence policy 
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could be dismissed as all talk and no action are long gone” (Solana, 2007, pg. 10).  I will 
evaluate if this is indeed the case.  Using the end of violence and maintenance of a stable 
peace as a gauge for success, I will use the following case studies to show situations 
where the ESDP has been both a success and a failure.  I will demonstrate that the 
important factors of operating within a potential EU member state, and the variance in 
operational mandates and political will have led to these different outcomes. 
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 ESDP Operation EUFOR-ALTHEA  
 My case study of Bosnia Herzegovina shows that the EU has indeed come a long 
way since the early 1990s in terms of their capabilities for conflict management.  The 
creation of ESDP has allowed them to take a lead in the region and manage effectively, in 
large part because of the EU’s willingness to discuss and facilitate future EU membership 
for BiH.  Over the course of the EU’s foreign policy history, the Balkans has been both a 
black eye and an important motivational tool.  The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina during 
the 1990s was an opportunity for the EU to show that they could handle delicate crisis 
issues in their own backyard.  Unfortunately, the EU was not capable of such serious 
conflict management during the early 90s.  As mentioned above, the resources and 
military abilities of NATO and the United States were absolutely necessary to bring 
about the signing of the Dayton Accords in 1995, which brought an end to the war in 
Bosnia.  However, by 2003 the EU had improved capabilities, which makes looking at 
recent operations, such as EUFOR-ALTHEA, helpful in assessing the EU’s foreign 
policy potential.  This operation was launched by the EU to ensure that a peaceful 
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situation would continue in BiH despite the drawback of NATO in the country.  
Specifically, the aim of Operation ALTHEA was to “provide deterrence, continued 
compliance with the responsibility to fulfill the role specified in Annexes 1.A and 2 of the 
General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) in BiH and to contribute to a safe and 
secure environment in BiH” (Council Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP).  The roles of those 
involved in the war that the EU was now charged to overlook were to: 
 “Establish a durable cessation of hostilities. Neither Entity shall threaten or use force 
 against the other Entity, and under no circumstances shall any armed forces of either 
 Entity enter into or stay within the territory of the other Entity without the consent of the 
 government of the latter and of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina…Establish 
 lasting security and arms control measures…[and] refrain from all offensive operations of 
 any type against each other” (GFAP, 1995). 
 
Essentially, the EU is there to make sure that another war does not break out in Bosnia 
and that the country can rebuild or develop the institutions and systems needed for a 
democracy to run effectively and peacefully.  ALTHEA was a significant milestone for 
the ESDP/EU because it had never before launched a mission of such a magnitude. 
 In fact, the initial transition to EU leadership in the conflict management effort after 
ALTHEA was launched was not easy.  For one, “it took seven months after the EU 
mission was launched to transfer information fully from NATO to the EU” (Montanaro-
Jankovski, 2007, pg. 149).  Overcoming these early logistical problems would be 
important for the success of the mission.  It was also important that the EU not rely on 
NATO any longer.  This would allow them to establish their own legitimacy in BiH and 
make it known that they were now in charge of the situation.  However, this was not easy 
given the fact that there is often a lot of bureaucracy involved in ESDP, as well as 
budgeting concerns with operations that often draw on the resources of willing individual 
member states. “Even if some are willing to push for a mission, they are not always 
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willing to contribute the necessary resources. This was the case of EUFOR- ALTHEA in 
Bosnia, for instance, where considerable time was required to obtain contributions” 
(Montanaro-Jankovski, 2007, pg. 143). 
 Despite these setbacks however, there has not been a major outbreak of violence in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina since the ESDP ALTHEA operation has been launched, and 
institutional reform appears to be taking place.  Whether this can be fully attributed to the 
presence of the EU, or other factors such as the lack of willingness for Bosnia Croats, 
Serbs and Bosniaks to get engaged in deadly conflict again, cannot be completely certain.  
There is no doubt however that the EU has played a positive role in maintaining peace.  
Militarily, this can be seen by the fact that troops are stationed and ready to intervene if 
there is another breakout of violence.  EUFOR-ALTHEA is a military operation, so the 
idea that the presence of a deterring force has been beneficial to peace is logical.  Just as 
important however has been the stated willingness of the EU to see the operation through 
and work to bring a lasting peace to BiH. “The persistence of the uncertainty in the 
Balkans emphasizes the need for ESDP and Community instruments to remain 
committed for the long haul in order to go through the complete cycle of conflict 
transformation to state-building” (Montanaro-Jankovski, 2007, pg. 142).  Considering 
that the EU is still there and no end date has been given for the operation, it appears that 
the EU is committing itself for an indefinite period of time to ensure that their success is 
maintained.  However, the EU has drawn back its troops to 2,500 (European Union, 
2008), showing that the operation has been working and that the EU believes Bosnia is 
becoming more stable. It is necessary however to point out the fact that the EU has an 
added tool for conflict management within Europe.  In creating CFSP/ESDP, “the EU 
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approach was predicated strongly on the notion that regional integration offered the 
strongest contribution to democracy and conflict resolution” (Youngs, 2006, 337).  
Nowhere is it more possible for the EU to facilitate regional integration than in Europe 
itself, due to the fact that the EU can offer membership.  A large part of the strategy in 
Bosnia has been getting the country to work towards signing a Stabilization and 
Association Agreement, which would bring them one step closer to EU membership.  
Considering the EU would not let BiH sign this if they were involved in a conflict, there 
is some extra motivation for peace in Bosnia.  However, the history behind the conflict 
has not made reaching this point easy.  Srecko Latal discussed how as recently as a year 
ago there were still disagreements between the EU and local leaders concerning police 
reforms, which was an obstacle to signing the SAA (2007).  On June 16, 2008 however, 
the SAA with Bosnia and Herzegovina was signed, allowing BiH to join the rest of the 
Balkan countries as potential EU member-states.   
 Because of the EU’s proximity to Bosnia and Herzegovina, EUFOR-ALTHEA has 
had a good chance of being successful.  The capabilities of ESDP itself allowed the EU to 
launch and maintain this rather large and significant mission.  However, the fact the 
Bosnia is located in Europe and the EU has the will to someday make them a member 
state has greatly increased the possibility for this conflict management attempt to be 
successful.  Essentially, the EU has greater capacity for conflict management in Europe 
itself, and their operational success in Bosnia is due in part to this.  If they are willing to 
wave the carrot of EU membership and get countries in conflict situations to bite, then the 
EU does not have to rely solely on the capabilities of the ESDP.  Of course, this option is 
not really available to the EU in places such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, which 
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makes it important for the EU to have the capacity to use other civilian or military 
measures to manage conflicts. 
 
 Social Improvements and the Potential for More 
 As will become more apparent, the Bosnia case study is much different from the 
other two.  Unlike the DRC or Aceh, Indonesia, Bosnia in all likelihood will become an 
EU member in the future.  Realizing this, the EU has helped Bosnia meet the social 
standards required to be a member state.  Peace and stability in Bosnia is important in 
making sure social improvements are made.  However, being on track to become a 
member state has also meant that Bosnia has received funding from the EU specifically 
for improving long-term well-being.  Because of this variable, which is missing in the 
other cases, it is more difficult to say that improvements in Bosnia are a result of the 
success of the ESDP operation.  That being said, the stability and lack of decline in well-
being since 2004, when the EU took over for NATO in managing the conflict, does show 
that operation ALTHEA has been successful, and that the EU can deal with crisis 
situations. 
 The fact that the EU has worked with Bosnia towards membership has been 
beneficial for both parties.  EU membership will stimulate the economy of Bosnia and 
give the government more tools for dealing with domestic social issues.  However, to 
become a member, Bosnia must meet many guidelines set forth by the EU, which 
includes stabilizing and committing to peace.  By motivating Bosnia to take initiative, 
managing the conflict has become easier for the EU.  “EU members are promoting 
accession because they consider enlargement to be in their long-term economic and 
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geopolitical interest” and likewise, “East European States take part in the laborious 
accession process because EU membership brings tremendous economic and geopolitical 
benefits particularly as compared to the uncertain and potentially catastrophic costs of 
being left behind as others move forward” (Moravcsik and Vachudova, 2003, pg. 43).  As 
Moravcsik and Vachudova point out, “One study forecasts long-term total gains to the 
new member states ranging from €23 to €50 billion” (2003, pg. 47).  Whether this money 
manifests itself in the form of new jobs, investment in capital, or increased government 
spending on social welfare, there is no doubt that it will be beneficial to the long-term 
well-being of Bosnia.  Of course, these improvements would be more directly related to 
EU membership than the success of ESDP operations in the country.  Yet, considering 
that the Stabilization and Association agreements were a long-term goal of EUFOR-
ALTHEA, if the gains to BiH are close to projected, a link between successful operations 
and improved livelihood of Bosnia’s citizens could be made. 
 There is however evidence already that this is the case.  While there is limited data 
to compare between present day Bosnia and Herzegovina and BiH during the war, due 
likely to the fact that information was difficult to gather during the war, the information 
that is available shows two different situations.  For example, according to the World 
Health Organization, per capita gross national income in 1994 was only $890.  As of 
2006 that number had risen to $6780, with the most significant year-to-year increase 
occurring between 1995 and 1996, directly after the Dayton Peace Accords were signed, 
when GNI more than doubled.  Another important measure cited by the WHO is the 
prevalence of Tuberculosis.  During the conflict in BiH, TB ranged from 150 to 134 
occurrences per 100,000 people.  Between 2002 and 2006 that number has been cut down 
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more than half, affecting only 65 to 57 people respectively. 
 Of course, because of the fact that many of these improvements were made prior to 
the EU operations, the success of those operations cannot be used to explain the 
improvement in social well-being.  The overall presence of third party actors can help 
explain this however, as there had been a strong UN or NATO presence in BiH before 
2004 and it was due to US State Dept diplomats that the peace agreement in 1995 was 
made.  What is important when looking at the EU’s effect is the fact that this 
improvement in well-being has not declined since 2004 when they took over for NATO 
in maintaining the conflict.  Due to the EU’s past failures in Bosnia and their relative lack 
of experience in conflict management, there were some worries that the switch could 
have negative consequences.  In reality however, those WHO statistics that could 
demonstrate well-being in Bosnia have not declined since 2004, suggesting that in this 
respect, the EU is doing fine, and their presence has not been detrimental to the long term 
well-being of the population.  In fact some minor improvements could be noted.  For 
instance, in 2002, 19.1% of people were living below the poverty line in BiH (Human 
Development Report-BiH, 2002, pg. 52).  As of 2006, there had been a decrease to 17.8% 
of people living below the poverty line (National Development Report, 2007, pg. 70).  
While these figure do not necessarily stand out as a huge success, nor can they be fully 
attributed to the presence of the EU, they do show further evidence that the EU is 
fulfilling its mandate, and that some form of a double pay-off is occurring, in both a 
continued peace and an improvement in social well-being. 
 One area where Operation ALTHEA and the EU in general have had difficulty 
showing improvements is corruption in Bosnia.  Due to the conflict and ethnic divisions 
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created by the war, corruption was able to seep into Bosnian society at many levels.  One 
area in particular where corruption can take root is in the employment sector, where a 
type of gray economy is created.  For this reason, employment/unemployment data can 
be somewhat misleading in BiH, giving a skewed image of social well-being.  Most 
sources list the unemployment rate around 31.8% (2006), which is actually an 
improvement after a continual rise from 1997 to 2003, when it peeked at 44.1%.  As the 
authors of the 2002 Human Development Report for BiH point out however, “Under 
current circumstances in BiH, the traditional concept of employment has lost much of its 
meaning and that more and more individuals are finding themselves in a twilight world 
between formal employers who pay only their social and health insurance and real 
employers who provide them with no labor rights or social entitlements” (pg. 37).  When 
jobs in this twilight sector are accounted for, unemployment can be figured at closer to 16 
or 17 per cent, which certainly shows how much corruption has impacted the lives of 
those in BiH. 
 The international community’s involvement in Bosnia has helped the situation 
somewhat, but more needs to be done.  Ending the conflict was important, as that cut out 
one access point for corruption.  Clearly however, that did not weed out all corrupt 
individuals, as it has still been a problem over the last decade.  In fact, “All Balkan 
countries registered scores of below five on a scale of one to 10 on TI’s Corruption 
Perceptions Index (CPI), ‘indicating that most face serious perceived levels of domestic 
corruption’” (Kathimerini, 2008).  For this reason, it is very important that the EU follow 
their own guidelines laid out in their comprehensive anti-corruption policy while dealing 
with Bosnia.  Additionally, European integration and future membership may help lessen 
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the corruption in Bosnia.  For example, “progress with public administration reform has 
been significantly slower in countries without tangible European integration prospects, 
since their leaders had much weaker incentives to adopt reforms that were usually at odds 
with the immediate economic and political self-interest” (Pop-Eleches, 2007, pg. 150).  If 
corruption does decline as BiH gets closer to EU membership, there will be continued 
improvement in the social well-being of its citizens.   
 Since the end of the Bosnian conflict in 1995, the country has had a lot of help in 
getting back to the place it was prior to the outbreak of the war.  Recently, the presence of 
the EU via EUFOR-ALTHEA has helped to bring peace and stability back to Bosnia. 
Additionally, the EU has the added tool in Bosnia of being able to pressure reform and 
improvement of social well-being with the possibility of EU membership.  Successful 
conflict management does increase the chance for long-term well-being.  This has been 
shown in part with this case study, and I will show it with more certainty with the case 
study on Aceh.  For the case of Bosnia though, both the success of ALTHEA and the 
improvements in social welfare are linked to the fact that Bosnia is so close to the EU, 
and the EU hopes to have them integrated into the EU as a member state in the near 
future. 
 
Democratic Republic of Congo 
 Operation Artemis and EUPOL Kinshasa 
 Unlike the case of Bosnia, ESDP operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
have not been very successful in managing and diminishing conflict.  Along with 
showing that this is true, I will also use this case study to present and explain the factors 
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that have led to this result.  Additionally, I hope to show that the problems associated 
with these operations can be fixed.  Ultimately, this analysis of the ESDP operations in 
the DRC will provide evidence that the EU has at times been to quick and narrow-minded 
in declaring operations successful, but also that with changes in scope and technique, 
conflict management in places such as the DRC can be successful. 
 The Democratic Republic of Congo has been the location of conflict for over a 
decade.  The conflict there has been “described by some as Africa’s first World War” and 
“has been the world’s deadliest conflict since World War II” (Shah, 2008).  When 
considering this, it is almost no surprise that the United Nations has been involved in 
peacekeeping efforts there.  Of course, considering that there has rarely been peace in the 
DRC since 1998, a peacekeeping operation may not exactly be effective in bringing about 
an end to the conflict.  In addition to the UN presence however, a number of EU missions 
have been launched and completed in the DRC.  The first, Operation Artemis, lasted from 
June-September 2003.  Another, EUPOL Kinshasa, lasted from April 2005 until June 
2007.  These operations are similar in that they both had a rather limited focus in the 
overall context of the situation in the DRC.   
  The mandate of Artemis was for “stabilizing security conditions and the 
humanitarian situation, ensuring protection of the airport, of internally displaced people 
(IDPs), and of civilians and the UN humanitarian personnel” (Martinelli, 2006, pg. 384).  
All of this was needed and important, however Artemis was only to be carried out in the 
city of Bunia.  Granted, Bunia was a center of the conflict, but the fact that the UN and 
EU limited the operation in such a way suggests that the EU either did not have the 
necessary capabilities for a larger, more inclusive mission, or simply did not have the will 
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for one.  As I described in section one, and showed in the case of Bosnia, the EU has 
shown that they do have the capabilities for large-scale missions.  However, unlike 
EUFOR-ALTHEA where over 6,000 troops were initially deployed, only 1,800 were 
used for Artemis (Hendrickson et al, 2008).  This does suggest that it was more a matter 
of will than capabilities.   
 Furthermore, the goals and strategies of Artemis seem to be driven more at 
protection of civilians than actual resolution of the conflict, which is ultimately what is 
needed in the DRC.  Providing security for government officials and humanitarians 
should be part of the operation.  However, unless the conflict itself is ended, protection 
alone is not a satisfactory conflict management strategy.  “The perennial lack of 
coordination is still present between CFSP diplomacy and post-conflict reconstruction 
activities supported by the Commission: Operation Artemis in the DRC is, for example, 
said to have suffered from a 'failure to better link military crisis management with wider 
peace building'” (Youngs, 2006, pg. 336).  Even had operation Artemis achieved all of its 
stated goals, the situation in Bunia, and the DRC as a whole, would not have been 
significantly improved. 
 Similarly, EUPOL Kinshasa was also limited in its potential from the outset. Its 
mandate was “to monitor, mentor, and advise the setting up and initial running of the IPU 
in order to ensure that the IPU acts following the training received in the academy Centre 
and according to international best practices in the field" (Council Joint Action 
2004/847/CFSP).  There is no doubt that a policing mission was important in the DRC, as 
some sort of effective civilian police unit is needed there, and rule of law must be 
established.  It is also true that the EU was helpful in providing the DRC with knowledge 
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in this area. “EUPOL technical advisors are working with officers in the IPU to draft the 
regulations for the Unit; they assist during patrol operations and they go out in the field 
with the IPU to provide feedback on shortcomings and difficulties as well as advice on 
how to overcome them” (Martinelli, 2006, pg. 391).  Again however, the fact that it was 
aimed just at the capital city of Kinshasa misses the fact that the conflict in the DRC was 
not limited to the cities or urban areas, but much more widespread. "In the remote regions 
of the DRC, hundreds of girls and women are being brutally raped every day. The 
perpetrators are rarely held accountable. The global community finally has to insist that 
the international humanitarian law is also implemented and observed in the most secluded 
areas of this country," (Malteser International, 2007). 
 However, there are those who would point out that EUPOL Kinshasa “is an 
operation intended to address only one of the huge problems that characterizes the 
situation in the DRC and as such it should not be burdened with excessive expectations” 
(Martinelli, 2006, pg. 389).  While this may indeed be the case, and while EUPOL 
Kinshasa may have been successful in achieving it’s mandate, in addressing whether or 
not the EU is effective in conflict management, the entire conflict must be looked at.  As 
Martinelli said, the lack of police was just one of many issues.  Therefore, to successfully 
manage the crisis, these other issues would have to be addressed, which is something the 
EU did not really do in the DRC. 
 Unfortunately, the conditions in the DRC show that the conflict has not really been 
resolved or managed very effectively. “Although the Congolese war officially ended in 
December 2002 with the signing of a peace accord, fighting and insecurity have 
continued in large areas of the east of the country. Up to April 2004, a total of 3.9 million 
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excess deaths had been attributed to the conflict” (Brennan et al, 2006), and since 1998, 
“regional armed conflict across the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has 
resulted in an estimated 5.4 million deaths, according to a January 2008 report by the 
non-governmental organization (NGO) International Rescue Committee (IRC)” (USAID, 
2008).  If these numbers were accurate, then that would mean that even since 2004, while 
the EU has been present in the region, some 1.5 million people have faced conflict-
related deaths.  With this in mind, it is hard to say that the EU’s capacity for conflict 
management has been very high in the DRC, even if individual operations have been 
somewhat of a success. 
 Much of the reason for continued conflict in the DRC is that those fighting have not 
been motivated to stop, or join together. “The failure to demobilize these troops or to 
integrate them into the army as part of the political transition permitted the confrontation 
that caused hundreds of civilian deaths” (Grignon and Kroslak, 2008).  Additionally, and 
as stated above, not enough effort has been put into actually bringing about a sustained 
peace.  While having military personal in place for protection, and training police is 
needed, these activities are designed more for post-conflict situations.  When there are 
still groups willing and wanting to fight, such as in the DRC, other measures are needed. 
“The UN mission, the EU, and all major embassies were unwilling to decisively pressure 
the Congolese actors, Kabila in particular, to structure and sustain a reliable and 
successful political negotiation process, which ultimately is the only way to end such 
deadly insurgencies” (Grignon and Kroslak, 2008).   
 It is interesting that this was the case in the DRC, when considering that, “at one 
gathering of EU special representatives and other senior officials a common view was 
  22 
that, in light of resource constraints, the EU should focus on containing immediate 
violent conflict rather than spending money and effort on long term social and political 
change” (Youngs, 2006, pg. 336).  Perhaps it was in part due to hindsight and the fact 
that the EU’s efforts in the DRC were not producing a real end to the violence that 
motivated the development of these opinions.  The truth of the matter is that while the EU 
may have declared both operations Artemis and Kinshasa a success, they certainly were 
not.  The mandates of the operations were only good enough to provide a band-aid for a 
conflict that required much more attention.  Fortunately, the political will that seemed to 
be lacking in 2003 and 2004 when these mission where launched may now be present in 
the EU.  This is evident by the fact that the EU did launch another mission in the DRC, 
called EUSEC RD Congo.  With more in depth goals and a mandate aimed more towards 
ending fighting, integrating the army and decommissioning arms, there is potential for the 
EU to make a larger impact.  As this mission is still ongoing, and has been stalled at 
times, whether or not positive results will emerge is yet to be seen.  If the EU continues to 
show a stronger desire for making ESDP function at a level it is capable off, then the EU 
can be successful conflict management actors, even outside of Europe.  They must of 
course avoid missions such as Kinshasa and Artemis that seemed to have no chance of 
providing steps toward an end to the conflict in the DRC. 
 
 More of the Same in Social ‘Well-Being’ 
 Unlike with Bosnia, the EU operations thus far completed in the DRC should 
hardly be called a success.  As already mentioned, while they may have met operational 
goals, doing so has not brought about what should be the primary goal of conflict 
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management, bringing an end to all of the conflict.  As such, the DRC has not 
experienced the secondary pay-off which successful conflict management can bring, an 
improvement in long term well-being for those where the conflict has taken place.  The 
rest of this case study on the DRC aims to show this fact.   
 When looking at World Health Organization figures from 2000 and 2006, one can 
see almost no difference in the well-being of the population.  For instance, the adult 
mortality rate per 1000 people in 2000 was 453, and in 2006 was still at 417, a very 
minor decrease considering the presence of the EU since 2003.  Similarly, death from TB 
among HIV-negative people per 100,000 actually increased from 63 to 69 between 2000 
and 2006, peaking at 72 during than time span.  The same lack of improvement during 
the period of EU involvement in the DRC can be seen in infant mortality rates, incidence 
of TB, life expectancy, and sanitation. 
 The operations completed in the DRC have not had a positive effect on the 
population.  In fact, what they were doing in the DRC is similar to what they are doing in 
Bosnia.  The problem is that there are two major differences between the two cases.  For 
one, violent conflict has been resolved in BiH while it clearly has not been in the DRC.  
This is evident in the fact that conflict has dictated the actions of the government even 
after the supposed peace treaty in 2002. “Government expenditure was much greater than 
expected in the second half of 2005 and several times in 2006” partly due to the 
“lawlessness in the eastern part of the country” (OECD, 2007, pg. 214).  The lawlessness 
referred to likely stems from the “Eastern provinces of Ituri, Nord-Kivu and Sud-Kivu, 
which have twice been the seat of rebellions that have plunged the DRC into war, [and] 
are still the scene of ethnic tension and daily violence” (OECD, 2007, pg. 220).  The fact 
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that the government has to divert or increase spending to deal with this conflict means 
that other uses for this money are being ignored.  The above WHO statistics seem to 
support this conclusion.  Further acknowledgment of this can be seen in the fact that “the 
fighting in recent years and the dilapidated state of the existing infrastructure have 
reduced access to drinking water from 37 per cent in 1990 to 22 per cent in 2004” 
(OECD, 2007, pg. 218).  Because the government of the DRC (which is now a 
democratically elected one), and the EU and other third party organizations have not 
actually ended the conflict itself in the DRC, there has been almost no improvement in 
social well-being in the last decade, and more importantly, since 2003 when EU 
operations began there. 
 Another important difference between the EU efforts in Bosnia and the DRC is the 
fact that the EU cannot motivate anyone in the DRC with the possibility of EU 
membership.  Within BiH that motivation has certainly helped to maintain the peace and 
improve social well-being, and had the EU been willing to discuss membership in 1995, 
it could have helped in the brokering of peace.  Unfortunately, this is not a viable option 
for the EU in their conflict management strategy for the DRC. This reiterates the point 
that they need to be doing more to bring a complete stop to the violence, as that seems to 
be one of the most important things they can do which would have a significant effect on 
the long-term improvement in the DRC. 
 There are a number of reasons why the EU’s presence has not made a significant 
impact.  As already mentioned, there has been a lack of will and operational failure.  An 
additional issue, which has been more of an obstacle to the EU, is corruption.  Like 
Bosnia and many other war torn countries, the DRC is plagued by corruption, which can 
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make progress difficult to achieve. “Corruption and mismanagement of natural resources 
is still a big problem…and Transparency International’s 2006 report ranked the DRC as 
the sixth most corrupt of 163 countries” (OECD, 2007, pg. 217).  Such obstacles can 
certainly hinder the performance and effect of third party actors, and combined with the 
presence of violence, the DRC situation as a whole is a difficult one.  Still, as has been 
and will be showed in this essay, the EU does have the skills and capabilities to bring 
about positive change.  The following discussion of the operation in Aceh shows that 
they are capable of bringing about a peaceful resolution to conflict without violent 
outbursts to follow.  Just as important is the fact that the EU is an economic union with 
years of experience in multinational trade and cooperation.  By working with the 
government of the DRC, as well as surrounding nations, the EU can help establish solid 
economic unions in the region.  The EU does recognize the benefits of this strategy, and 
have stated a desire for “establishing a strong relationship with the African Union and 
sub-regional organisations” (Assembly of WEU, 2007).  The combination of utilizing 
national resources efficiently and working with regional partners could help legitimize 
economic practices and decrease the amount of corruption. 
 Thus far, EU operations have not produced many long-term benefits for the DRC.  
The combination of continued violence and corruption makes it difficult to believe that 
this will change if things continue on the same course.  If however the EU committed 
themselves to ending the conflict, they could stop the violence, and take a major step 
towards improving the well-being of the population.  An end to conflict should cut off 
one source of entry for corrupt individuals, as well as give the government more 
opportunities to focus on the needs of the nation.  At that point, it will also be more 
  26 
feasible to combat the corruption that has already taken root over the decade of fighting.  
Addressing there two issues will ultimately create an opportunity to see improvements in 
all of the areas mentioned above that have virtually been stuck at levels which are 
unacceptable and certainly not indicative of being well.   
 
Aceh Indonesia 
 AMM-Aceh Monitoring Mission 
 The final case study is a clear example of the potential for the EU and ESDP to be 
successful in conflict management.  Like the case of the DRC, this operation was 
performed outside of Europe, taking away the carrot of EU membership.  However, 
unlike the DRC, this case study shows an EU with a strong political will, and a focused 
strategy capable of ending the conflict and being successful even without being able to 
offer membership into the EU.  The Aceh case study is a positive example that the EU 
should build off of and reference when performing ESDP operations. 
 Aceh is a further example that the EU has been willing to perform ESDP operations 
outside of the European Continent.  In this case they played a very important role in the 
resolution of conflicts in the Aceh province of Indonesia.  While not as large as the 
conflict in the DRC, Aceh had been the site of political conflicts and fighting between the 
government military forces and Aceh based rebel forces for a number of years prior to 
EU engagement.  In addition to being an example of a successful, legitimizing mission 
for the EU, the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) was a reminder of the larger 
importance that the international community can have in conflict management and 
resolution.  Prior to the EU monitored peace, other breaks for peace had been attempted 
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in Aceh. “A first agreement was signed in May 2000.  It focused on a ‘humanitarian 
pause’ in order to ease dialogue between parties.  This potential breakthrough in favour 
of negotiations failed. Attacks by either sides on the ground did not halt” (Braud and 
Grevi, 2005, pg. 19).  Without an outside or international body monitoring the peace, 
rebels were not willing to hand over their weapons to the government, and neither side 
could trust the other enough to bring an end to the conflict.  It was for this reason that the 
government and the rebels sought out the EU in 2005 to monitor the forthcoming peace 
treaty. 
 While the EU was not actually present for the negotiations of the peace treaty, they 
took the lead in the post-conflict management, with the help of five ASEAN nations.  
Unlike some of the other ESDP operations, the AMM had a rather comprehensive 
mandate and set of goals: 
 
“1. The AMM shall monitor the implementation of the commitments undertaken by the 
GoI [Government of Indonesia] and the GAM [Free Aceh Movement] pursuant to the 
MoU [Memorandum of Understanding]. 
2. In particular, the AMM shall: 
(a) monitor the demobilization of GAM and monitor and assist with the decommissioning 
and destruction of its weapons, ammunition and explosives; 
(b) monitor the re-location of non-organic military forces and non-organic police troops; 
(c) monitor the reintegration of active GAM members; 
(d) monitor the human rights situation and provide assistance in this field in the context 
of the tasks set out in points (a), (b) and (c) above; 
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(e) monitor the process of legislation change; 
(f) rule on disputed amnesty cases; 
(g) investigate and rule on complaints and alleged violations of the MoU; 
(h) establish and maintain liaison and good cooperation with the parties” (Council Joint 
Action 2005/643/CFSP) 
 
Compared to policing and humanitarian protection missions, the goals of the AMM were 
designed much more around the idea of ensuring the end of conflict and the ability for the 
peace process to play out, which is exactly what monitoring missions should do.  
“Assessed against the Concept for EU Monitoring Missions and the subsequent steps 
towards setting up a real monitoring capacity for ESDP, the AMM measures up well to 
the outlined objectives and expectations” (Braud and Grevi, 2005, pg. 33).  Successfully 
meeting each of these goals should mean that the conflict in Aceh would not continue. 
 Indeed, the situation in Aceh has been greatly improved since the signing of the 
peace treaty and the launching and completion of the AMM.  It is important to note again 
that the conflict in Aceh was nowhere near as deadly as that in BiH or the DRC.  Still, 
since 1999, there have been 2017 battle related deaths in Aceh (Dept. of Peace and 
Conflict Research) and an estimated “15,000 people died in the conflict during its 30-year 
duration” (Aceh Poverty Assessment, 2008, pg. 16).  What is most important is how few 
deaths there have been since the EU got involved in 2005. A “positive trend was that the 
violence decreased substantially after the peace accord was in place. For the entire 2005 
there were 210 battle related deaths but only two of these occurred after the agreement 
was signed” (Dept. of Peace and Conflict Research).  The major decrease in violent 
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activity is just one sign of the success of the Aceh Monitoring Mission, but this fact along 
with overall decrease in political tensions between Aceh and the Jakarta government 
allowed the EU to call this mission a success and leave in 2006. 
 There are a number of reasons why the ESDP mission in Aceh was a success for the 
EU and why it should be seen as an example of the EU’s capacity for conflict 
management.  First of all, from early on, there appeared to be a strong political will 
shown by many within the EU to take a leadership position in Aceh, and get involved 
quickly after the signing of the peace agreement.  Whereas “operations in the DRC, 
Macedonia and Bosnia all had long lead-in times for planning, and did not constitute 
prompt responses to crisis” (Youngs, 2006, pgs. 335-336), the AMM was in place just a 
month after the GoI and GAM signed their agreement.  Not only that, but due to 
informal, non-ESDP activities during that interim month, the AMM was able to transition 
rather smoothly into operation. “Had a robust IMP [Initial Monitoring Presence] not been 
in place, it would have been difficult to set up a training course of comparable quality, 
tailor made for the environment and the goals of the mission” (Braud and Grevi, 2005, 
pg. 24).   
 This will and desire to get involved in Aceh, which was likely the result of 
realization that it could potentially help the image of the EU, as well as the fact that they 
were explicitly sought out by the GoI and GAM, can also explain how the AMM was 
successful despite the typical problems that the EU runs into when trying to organize 
ESDP missions. The implementation and running of the Aceh Monitoring Mission 
“should be welcomed as evidence of the ability to respond to an urgent request for EU 
intervention, in the absence of the financial and logistical means required for timely 
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planning and implementation” (Braud and Grevi, 2005, pg. 6).  Even though the EU 
entered Indonesia without having a clear idea of how everything would be funded or run, 
they made it a priority to get involved quickly and accepted the fact that they would have 
to adapt while they were there.  This was extremely important because in such a conflict, 
a very small spark could potentially reignite the conflict if no one is there to put it out, 
which the EU was.  Additionally, in any conflict management situation, it would be very 
difficult to be map out the whole course of an operation and follow that through to a 
successful completion.  Because unknown factors can be added, it is important to be able 
to adapt, and the speed in which the AMM was launched forced the EU to do this, and 
allowed them to learn how to do this, which will be important for future operations. 
 These factors allowed for perhaps the most important goal of the operation to be 
achieved, which was the opening of communications between the rebels and government 
and the establishment of some trust. “Implementation relies on an efficient monitoring 
mechanism to overcome the accumulated mistrust of the Acehnese towards Jakarta.  In 
this perspective, the credibility and efficiency of the Aceh Monitoring Mission has been 
an important as the agreement to stabilize Aceh province” (Braud and Grevi, 2005, pg. 
20).  The effective running of the AMM brought together the two sides, which was the 
key step in achieving all of the other goals and ensuring the violent conflict was over. 
 Aside from just ending the conflict, the MoU was designed to allow for some self-
determination and integration of Aceh into the government. The terms of the peace 
agreement required that “a new Law on the Governing of Aceh enter into force not later 
than 31 March 2006…[which] set the framework for the elections in April 2006.”  
Furthermore, “the Government of Indonesia has agreed to facilitate the legitimization to 
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the two Aceh-based political parties” (Braud and Grevi, 2005, pg. 27).  Due to the efforts 
of the EU, this and other aspect of the MoU could be realized. “The AMM [had] been 
organized in such a way as to ensure both a capillary presence in the ground and mobility 
across the region to ensure the implementation of the MoU”  (Braud and Grevi, 2005. pg. 
28).  Such organization permitted the EU to get a lot accomplished in a relatively short 
time.  Essentially, the true success of the Aceh Monitoring Mission lays in the fact that 
the EU took on a robust mandate.  The previous factors of course helped the EU meet all 
of these goals, but the fact that the EU identified what was needed to prevent conflict 
from re-emerging and pursued these issues meant that successfully meeting the missions 
goals would very likely successfully manage the conflict as a whole, meeting the larger 
ESDP goals. 
 
 Post-Conflict Improvements in Spite of Natural Disaster 
 Unlike with the cases of BiH and the DRC where violent conflict was probably the 
largest factor in people’s lives while it was going on, Aceh was in the unfortunate 
position to have to deal with two crises at once.  Prior to EU involvement in bringing 
about peace in Aceh, the province was one of the hardest hit by the tsunami in December 
of 2004.  Despite the devastation however, Aceh has rebounded, both in the tsunami 
affected coastal areas with the help of international aid, and those areas plagued by 
conflict, due to successful efforts of the AMM as mentioned above.  In this section I will 
show how the EU efforts in conflict management have improved the long-term well-
being of those affected by the conflict.  Particularly, this section shows the changing 
trends in poverty levels and improvements in infrastructure and services due to the end of 
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fighting. 
 The conflict, which had existed in Aceh for decades and had intensified in the years 
prior to EU involvement, had been very devastating for many people. “Aceh has 
experienced very low or negative growth rates for most of the past three decades, lagging 
behind Indonesia and North Sumatra in most years. The main reason for this slower 
growth was the longstanding conflict affecting the province…As a result, Aceh has 
poverty levels well above those seen in most other regions in Indonesia” (Aceh Poverty 
Assessment, 2008, pg. 8).  In addition to negative effects on poverty, “the conflict also 
impacted the physical infrastructure, in particular the road network and social services 
such as health and education” (WFP Post-Tsunami Emergency Needs Assessment, 2005, 
pg. 12), and “is likely to have been a contributing factor to the high morbidity levels in 
Aceh” (Aceh Poverty Assessment, 2008, pg. 47).  Similarly to Bosnia and the DRC, 
conflict had led to more then just violence and death, but an overall decrease in the 
quality of daily life for the people of Aceh. 
 Fortunately, the post-conflict period has seen improvements in the well-being of 
those previously affected by the conflict. Where conflict had previously been a very large 
factor contributing to poverty, this trend has decreased of late. “In 2004, households in 
conflict areas were 29 percent more likely to be poor.  This relative difference increased 
to 43 percent in 2005 but had disappeared in 2006 possibly suggesting that benefits from 
the end of conflict are beginning to emerge in those areas as well” (Aceh Poverty 
Assessment, 2008, pg. 16).  Additionally, improvements in health and education can be 
witnessed in Aceh, particularly for those who were displaced by the conflict. 
 One significant reason for these improvements is directly related to the end of the 
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conflict and the peace agreement made between the Acehnese and Jakarta.  With the 
continued decentralization and autonomy that Aceh was given after the peace settlement, 
the local government is much more in control of decision-making and resources.  This is 
significant when considering that, “Aceh received an unprecedented amount of assistance 
from the Indonesian government and the international community, estimated at about 
US$7.5 billion over a period of five years” (Aceh Poverty Assessment, 2008, pg. 9).  
While much of this was funding was a result of the tsunami, in actuality the local 
government has control of these resources, which means they can also go to use in 
improving the lives of those who lived in the conflict ridden sections of Aceh.  It has 
already been shown that the Aceh Monitoring Mission, the EU’s ESDP operation in 
Indonesia, was very successful and can be seen as a great example of the EU’s 
peacemaking, and conflict management capabilities.  In addition to having the direct 
effect of drastically reducing violence and decommissioning arms to prevent future 
conflict, it can also be seen that the success of the operation has the secondary effect of 
improving the long-term well-being of those in Aceh. 
 
Table 2: Changes in Long-Term Well-Being as a result of ESDP Operations 
 
 
BiH DRC Aceh 
ESDP 
affects on 
Human 
Welfare 
1. Potential EU membership, 
which would bring economic 
benefits. 
2. Decreases in poverty 
3. Maintenance of improved 
well-being achieved prior to 
EU involvement (i.e. 
Increased GNI and decrease 
in infectious disease) 
Lack of successful 
operations has translated 
into having no 
improvements in human 
welfare. 
1. Decreases in 
poverty and significant 
drop in likelihood of 
becoming poor. 
2. Improvements to 
infrastructure, 
benefiting education 
and health care. 
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Evaluation and Potential of the EU and ESDP 
 It is very clear that the EU has embarked on a path towards becoming a major 
player in global security and would like to be involved in dealing with crisis situations 
both in Europe and abroad.  By effectively handling these situations, the international 
community can not only bring about and maintain an end to conflict, but help countries or 
regions of the world prosper.  The major question of course is whether or not the EU can 
actually live up to its’ own expectations and positively add to conflict management.  
From analyzing the various ESDP operations and attempts at conflict management in 
Bosnia, the DRC and Aceh, as well the looking at the EU’s capabilities in terms of 
conflict management, it does seem that the EU has the capacity to effectively involve 
themselves in conflict situations. 
 What the analyses show, is that in order to maintain a peaceful situation, the EU has 
to use their resources towards pursuing strategies such as integrating rebels in society, 
decommissioning arms, and monitoring to ensure peace treaties are upheld.  This means 
that they will have to set out with more objectives in mind than is evident from past 
missions such as EUPOL Kinshasa or Operation Artemis in the DRC.  In future cases that 
may be similar to the DRC, the EU must first deal with putting an end to the violence 
before trying to improve and change institutions.  Given the improved tools of the EU, 
they should be better equipped to do this now than they were in their initial efforts in 
Bosnia for example.  Once these conditions are met, the EU can use the example of their 
post-conflict successes in Aceh to maintain a lasting peace, and then attempt policing 
efforts where needed. 
 Furthermore, the improved conditions in BiH and Aceh, Indonesia, in contrast to 
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the continuing poor conditions in the DRC shows a correlation between the success of 
conflict management attempts and long-term well-being in the countries where they are 
taking place.  Of course, success cannot just be measured in meeting the goals of an 
operation, unless the stated goals include bringing about, or maintaining an end to 
violence.  As long as violence and the negative consequences of violence persist, such as 
corruption and displacement of people, it is unlikely that a population can see much long-
term improvement in their lives, no matter what else a government does. 
 I do believe that CFSP and ESDP will continue to function and be successful into 
the future.  One reason for this is the presence of Javier Solana.  Not only does he himself 
seem extremely committed to maintaining an active foreign policy, but he also is the type 
of leader who can convince others.  This will be important when attempting to receive 
resources from member states for ESDP operations.  Also, given the fact that a number of 
operations have been very successful, I find it unlikely that the EU will back away from 
ESDP in the near future.  If the EU as a whole continues to be as steadfast as Solana 
himself, and they work off of their past successes and learn from mistakes, I see no 
reason why they cannot be even more effective in future operations.   
 At this point the EU has had success in all types of individual operations, be they 
monitoring, policing or military.  What has tarnished their overall capacity for conflict 
management has been the fact that while operations may be a success, the actual 
conditions in some of the countries they are in have not improved greatly.  As long as the 
EU commits to strategies and designs mandates that will actually prevent the further 
breakout of violence, which they are capable of doing given their military, civilian and 
economic resources, they will have the capacity for effective conflict management.  
  36 
Therefore, the future success of CFSP and ESDP, and the EU’s foreign policy as whole, 
rests largely in Brussels.  If there is a willingness to do what it takes to be successful in 
the future, then the EU has the ability to be successful. 
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